How have other countries and organisations responded to Transnational Repression?

United States of America (Federal Government)

In the United States, the FBI includes a dedicated TNR page on its website, which features resources such as a Threat Intimidation Guide and profiles of those sought in relation to acts of TNR. Crucially it also includes a hotline and email address for anyone in the US (irrespective of citizenship) to report TNR, though this is a pre-existing mechanism for reporting complaints rather than a service set up specifically for TNR. While the hotline could be a vital tool for those being targeted to seek investigation, protection and prosecution, the degree to which it can offer support outside criminal investigation processes is unclear.

In March 2025, federal legislation focused on strengthening the US response to the threat of transnational repression was introduced. Republican congressman Gabe Evans reintroduced the Law Enforcement and Counter Transnational Repression Act.

United States of America (State Government)

In the US, as of 2026, there has only been one state of 50 to have introduced legislation addressing transnational repression: the state of Texas. In March of 2025, Texas introduced the Transnational Repression Act. The act requires the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) to include information about foreign governments, and foreign terrorist organisations which are frequently involved in acts of transnational repression, and the methods which they use to conduct TNR. The Bill also mandates that a person commits an offense if the person commits or conspires to commit: trafficking of persons, assault, aggravated assault, harassment, stalking, or compelling prosecution; a first degree felony on the charge of transnational repression in Texas therefore results in a minimum term of imprisonment for 15 years. Transnational repression committed in the second degree occurs when an agent, or organisation of a foreign government works without authorisation of the state of Texas or the US federal government.

The DPS have since been required to develop a training programme for peace officers regarding transnational repression. This requires that the training programme prepares these officers to perform certain tasks and include information about foreign governments and foreign terrorist organisations which are frequently involved in acts of TNR.

The DPS, in collaboration with the Office of the Governor, are further required to conduct a study on the threat of transnational repression. As of March 2026, the DPS have submitted reports to each member of the legislature, on the conclusions of their study, including any recommendations for legislative, or any other action to reduce the threat of transnational repression.

Action against TNR in the United States, is however still limited due to the Trump administration reversing the advancements in tackling the threat that were instated under the Biden administration.

Sweden

Sweden’s criminal code includes a charge of refugee espionage, which refers to intelligence activities directed against opposition figures, regime critics and other minority groups in Sweden. Cases brought using this provision include a 2019 charge against a Swedish-Iraqi citizen who was monitoring members of the Iranian diaspora with the “intention of conveying the information to the government of Iran”. Such cases are included in the security service’s annual reports, helping to raise public awareness.

Finland

In Finland, a similar approach to Sweden has been supported by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, which includes public information on its website regarding the actions of “authoritarian regimes … to spy on citizens who have emigrated to Finland and engage in activities that these regimes consider a threat”. Finland has signposted the risks from Russia and its influence on refugees in Finland as a justification for bringing in this provision.

France

In France, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI) includes public information including case study examples on its website. It has also established an email and phone helpline for those targeted by TNR to report incidents or threats. As with the FBI hotline, this is not limited to French citizens, and is a pre-existing mechanism used for other incidents as well.

The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, to counter state-sponsored interference in diaspora communities, the government has a national strategy. This strategy lays out three tiers being:

1. Law enforcement agencies, intelligence and security services enhancing their understanding to the threat TNR poses to national security
2. Using diplomatic channels to express concerns about TNR to the perpetrating state which has interfered within Dutch society.
3. Increasing perseverance amongst Dutch society by building networks amongst communities and raising awareness regarding the threat of TNR.

The Dutch government further deploys a range of administrative and judicial measures to intervene in confirmed cases of interference. To achieve this national strategy, the government established the Alliance against Foreign Interference in 2022 to convene diaspora communities and relevant civil society members to discuss transnational repression. The Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice and Security have further announced a reporting centre for victims of transnational repression.

Central Dutch government has also committed to taking various measures to oppose what it deems as undesirable foreign interference. This includes but is not limited to educating people such as specific groups of migrants, and local government staff about transnational repression and who is behind it, and who experiences it. The government is also in direct contact with groups of migrants who have families in countries exerting transnational repression and aiming to valuate if these people are encountering problems due to their ties to these countries.

In 2025, the government expanded its capacity to criminalise various forms of espionage, specifically digital and diaspora espionage, which now constitute to a new criminal provision within the Dutch criminal code (Wetboek van Strafrecht). As a result, people who engage in espionage activities for a foreign government face a maximum sentence of 8 years, with computer-related espionage carrying harsher penalties if done so on behalf of a foreign government. In extreme cases of espionage leading to someone’s death, the maximum prison term becomes 12 years. Maximum punishments in these cases are also to be increased for several other offences associated with espionage. The law is intended to protect national security, public safety, critical infrastructure and high-value technologies more effectively.

If these laws are broken, Dutch police then investigate under guidance of the public prosecution service. The police then gather evidence, for example by interviewing witnesses and victims, conducting an investigation and arresting suspects. From such investigations, the Public Prosecution Service or Counter Terrorism unit can then decide on whether to provide the victim additional protection.

Canada

The Canadian Government launched a public inquiry into foreign interference in September 2023, following the killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Sikh separatist leader in Canada. In June 2024, Bill C-70, An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference, was enacted. The Bill intended to strengthen “Canada’s ability to detect, disrupt and counter foreign interference threats to all people in Canada, including members of diaspora communities, through a series of new measures and legislative amendments to national security and criminal laws.”

Canada has also engaged with international and local partners to address TNR. For example, it is among the signatories of the Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware. This was the first commitment to work collaboratively to counter spyware misuse against activists, dissidents, journalists, national security, and information systems. In 2025, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police coordinated with local police services to develop training programs to “help law enforcement personnel recognize and respond effectively to TNR.” This aligns with Canada’s goal of engaging the community to counter TNR, as stated by the leaders at the 2025 G7 summit in Kananaskis, Alberta.

The G7 Leader’s Statement on TNR provided a first working definition of TNR, and committed to fostering a common understanding of TNR, raise awareness, and promote accountability for perpetrators of TNR. As part of these efforts, the G7 and associated countries developed the G7 Compendium of Tools to Counter Transnational Repression, which is a TNR resilience and response framework that supports policymakers in developing tools and resources to combat TNR. Recently in late 2025, Global Affairs Canada hosted the first Digital Transnational Repression Detection Academy as part of the G7 Leader’s Statement to provide technical skills for responding to technology-facilitated threats. Another initiative prompted from the Leader’s Statement includes Canada, the UK, and other stakeholders supporting the Common Good Cyber Fund. The Fund plans to operate with an annual budget of USD $50 million and promote a “safer, more resilient digital ecosystem that defends democracy, free expression, and human rights.”

United Nations

In The United Nations 2025 Civic Space Brief, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has stated that “in accordance with international human rights, all states must respect and protect human rights, and refrain from committing, enabling, or conducting acts of transnational repression. The brief further sets out that states, and other relevant actors including businesses, civil society, NGOs and the international community are encouraged to take the following actions:

• Awareness and Training: Recognising threats of TNR and raising public awareness, ensuring that relevant national authorities including law enforcement agencies, the judicial system, diplomats, intelligence services and officials working with asylum seekers should know how to detect and deal with TNR. Human Rights Defenders should be equipped with the tools and training to better protect themselves from these threats. The UN suggests systematic documentation of incidents of TNR for better analysis of risks, trends and methods of TNR.
• Holistic Protection for persons at risk or targeted: This includes reviewing protection programmes and policies to provide better protection for human rights defenders, including through documentation/legal assistance, humanitarian visas, resettlement programmes, psychological/livelihood support, counselling and peer support. The UN further suggests that protection programmes and policies should be victim-centred, gender-sensitive, intersectional, inclusive and non-discriminatory. This should be achieved through an in-government focal point whereby the government should act as the first point of contact, record cases and coordinate measures by government agencies to address protection gaps and risks.
• Accountability and Legal Recourse: Conducting systematic investigations into threats, attacks – including gender-specific ones – online surveillance and other techniques to ensure that perpetrators are held accountable and effective mechanisms for reparation and remedy are available for victims. Extradition procedures should be transparent, efficient and should consider international human rights and refugee law safeguards. Additional vetting should be applied regarding Interpol Red Notices in accordance. States should take into account countries’ transnational repression record when considering bilateral agreements.
• Digital Security and Technology Measures: A moratorium should be applied on the export of surveillance “spyware” tools and protect end-to-end encryption. governments should stress the responsibility of technology companies to conduct thorough human rights and gender due diligence in line with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Further, governments should encourage tech companies to address digital transnational repression, by strengthening privacy and data protection, and increasing transparency regarding how they respond to such government requests.

European Union

EU member states currently do not have a cohesive and universal definition of transnational repression adopted, making the handling of cases in the EU varied.

The EU as an institutional body recognises the varied ways in which member states respond to cases of TNR; “using diverse tactics, instituting systematic policies for outreach to the diverse communities affected; proving training for the different state representatives who may encounter transnational repression and ensuring that judicial systems understand the threats that people may face from other countries.” Official reports from the European Parliament of 2026 recognise that TNR perpetrations, such as human rights abuses, foreign interference and hybrid threats are all already against international law, but with the increase of cases the EU are recommending that all member states adopt their own official definitions to transnational repression, create resource and national hubs, adopt policies for outreach to affected communities. Enact new policies to strengthen information-sharing, impose consequences on state actors that engage in transnational repression and sustain diplomatic engagement on transnational repression.

The European Parliament has urged that member states:

• Enhance inter-parliamentary cooperation.
• States are encouraged to actively engage with the UN, regional institutions and civil society for the development of tools to trace digital acts of TNR; partnering with the Council of Europe and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA.
• Authorities should receive training with the enactment of TNR focal points of local community collaboration.
• Existing legislation should be reviewed to ensure that TNR acts are included and being investigated through infrastructure that can be updated (rather than demanding states create new mechanisms of tackling TNR).

Council of Europe

The Council of Europe does not have an adopted and universal approach to TNR but does tackle the human rights abuses under pre-existing laws. e.g. placing sanctions against those that are a threat to or have jeopardised human rights.

Although a formal definition is not agreed upon by the Council of Europe, or its member states, progress has been made on specific aspects, such as academic freedoms which are under threat from TNR. This has been recognised by the Council of Europe but currently only extends to publishing recommendations for policy approaches of their member states, rather than adopting Council-wide approach of implementations.

The Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists, which is a platform for media freedom violations across Member States has started to monitor and report on TNR attacks on journalists, including in the most recent reports.

There are current calls for civil society for the Council of Europe to establish a convention against TNR, led by Working Group member International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR).

G7

The G7 is an informal forum of major Western economies including Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the UK and the US. The 51st G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta: Canada 2025, the G7 leaders delivered a joint statement on transnational repression, including transnational repression within the broader category of foreign interference.

The G7 acknowledged that TNR undermines state sovereignty, national security, the safety of human rights and victims, and principles of international law; which in turn has a ‘chilling effect’ throughout the countries of the G7. The G7 condemns all acts of TNR, including but not limited to:

• Threats or acts of physical violence.
• Misuse of cooperation with other foreign states, international bodies and intergovernmental organisations in order to target, detain or repress.
• Forced return by confiscating passports and other means.
• Digital forms of transnational repression particularly targeting women.
• Misuse of spyware and cyber tools to engage in surveillance, and to enable physical forms of transnational repression.
• Direct or implicit threats against family members.

Building upon the 2018 Charlevoix Committment on defending democracy from foreign threats, the leaders of the G7 ‘commit to a common understanding of TNR, raise awareness, and promote accountability to increase the costs for those who commit acts of TNR.’ As part of these efforts the G7 intends to:

• Build a global understanding of the threat and its corrosive impact, including on human rights and democracy; this includes reporting on TNR in G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) public reports, and strengthening engagement in relevant multilateral fora.
• Develop a TNR Resilience and Response Framework that includes measures to boost G7 cooperation to counter TNR; a compendium of operational, diplomatic, policy, legislative and community engagement best practices; and information sharing around the latest techniques, trends and vectors of TNR observed globally.
• Launch a Digital TNR Detection Academy through the G7 RRM to build a collective capacity to detect TNR online; the Academy will provide G7 and partners with the technical skills and tools for identifying and responding to the latest technology-enabled threats.
• Support those who may be targets of TNR as well as members of civil society who are actively working to counter the threat, including through initiatives like the Canada-UK Common Good Cyber Fund, and by acting in solidarity with states affected by TNR.

The G7 claims it will redouble its efforts to keep its communities safe, to defend human rights, including the freedom of expression both online and offline, and to defend their sovereignty.

Other relevant examples

There are examples of local authorities in other countries seeking to push back against TNR, even when there may not be state-wide protections in place.

For example, when the Chinese embassy in Italy warned that an exhibition in Brescia of work by artist and CCP critic Badiucao would “endanger the friendly relations between Italy and China”, Brescia’s mayor released a statement stating Brescia had “always championed freedom of expression and would continue to do so. Art should never be censored.” Despite his intervention, however, there were reports of surveillance of attendees by unknown third parties and of vandalism of promotional materials.